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Abstract
This paper deals with information and policy announcements in non-coope-
rative dynamic games. It fits in the discussion on time inconsistency of
optimal policy under forward looking expectations. For some simple exam-
ples results are derived in the field of inemory strategies and in the
field oE consistent, credible and cheating strategies.1
1. Introduction
Optimization tecliníques developed for physical and engineeríng syatems
are often applied to the control of economic systems. The objective
Eunctional of the controller (e.g. the government) ís minimized given a
passive economic system. However, as Lucas [1976] has etressed, an eco-
nomy is not a passive system. in an economy there are, in general, seve-
ral independently actinK controllers. The actiona of these controllers
depend on their expectattons wlth respect to the actions of the other
decision makers. Furward looking expectations ruin the standard non-an-
tícipatton pruperty of a system. Ae Kydland and Prescott [1977) have
noticed the optimal policy is tíme inconsistent.
Kydland and Prescott [1977] came more or less to the conclusion that the
optimal control approach as such was under reconsideration. Iater on,
however, it became the common idea that the optimal control approach had
to be placed in a game theory framework. The revival of dynamic game
theory in economic literature was a fact. The famous result of Simaan
and Cruz [1973] that Bellman's principle of optimality does not genera-
lize to the Stackelberg solution became known as time inconsistency.
What is actually the problem? The answer to this question has a techni-
cril side and a conceptual síde. Technically speaking the problem is that
dynamic programming can not be used to find the closed loop no memory
Stackelberg solution. Conceptually speaking the problem ís that the glo-
bal Stackelberg decision model yields policies which become sub-optimal
in the course of the game when reoptimizing is allowed for: in the fu-
ture there can be an incentive to change the policy which was originally
established. Furthermore, it is hard to defend a decision model in which
the follower believes such a time ínconsistent announcement of the lea-
der.
The Stackelberg solution concept is a sequential concept: the players
act one after another. The follower knows the action of the leader when
he acts himself. However, t}ie follower does not know the leaders future
actions. He has to decide on the basís of the leaders announcement. In-
centives to cheat arise for t11e leader because of the time inconsisten-
cy. T~ao solutions can be distinguished. Firstly, the follower believes
the announcement and the leader does not cheat or reoptimize. This situ-2
ation results in the global Stackelberg outcome. Secondly, a reoptimiza-
tion in the future is to be expected. Oudiz and Sachs [1984] give a nice
interpretation: a change in government. This outcome has to be consis-
tent. That is to say, a future reoptimization will not lead to a change
in policy. Otherwise the announcement will not be believed. The feedback
stagewise Stackelberg solution, which is found by means of dynamic pro-
gramming, is consistent by construction. It is also possible to formu-
late a consistent open-loop Stackelberg solution. The reputation of the
government plays an impor[ant role here. It is an intereating idea to
try to formalize the concept of reputation (see e.g. Kreps and Wilson
[1982] and Barro and Gordon [1983]. Ln dynamic finite horizon games the
loss of reputation in the course of the game can be formalized by an
end-penalty.
it is important to note that these problematic aspects of the Stackel-
berg concept can also occur in a game where the players have to perform
their actions at the same time. One of the players (e.g. the government)
can try to become a Stackelberg leader by announcing his policy before
it is actually played. In this type of game additional incentives to
cheat arise! Generally, the leader can gain by cheating on his announce-
ment at the time of action. It is reasonable to assume that the effect
of cheating will be that the follower will not believe the announcements
anymore. Three solutions can be distinguished. Firetly, the follower
helieves thi nnnorrnc~ement anci the leader does not eheat or reoptimize.
This sitnation reti~rltti ai;ain in the Stackelberg outcome. Secondly, a
reoptimization Ln the future is to be expected. This outcome has to be
consistent. Finally, cheating is expected. In this case the announcement
has to be "cheating-proof". Therefore it is necessary, but not auffi-
cient, that the announcement is consistent. It will be shown that the
Nash concept seems to be the only reasonable concept for this game. For
this reason the Nash announcement can be called a credíble announcement.
When cheating is not expected, but occurs anyhow, several outcomes are
possible. For example, the follower believes the announcement, consis-
tent or not, but the leader cheats on his announcement. It is reasonable
to assume that after this has happened the follower stops believing. All
possible outcomes have to be evaluated by the leader against his expect-
ed los~; of reputation.3
The paper is organized as Pollows. Sectíon 2 elaborates on informatlon.
Some papers (e.g. Aackus and Driffill [1985]) jump very quickly from an
open-loop Stackelberg framework to a feedback stagewise or dynamic pro-
gramming framework in order to achieve consistency. It is true that the
Eeedback stagewise solution concept has very nice properties (like sub-
game perfectness). It presupposes, however, information on the state of
the system. A change in information structure should not be justífied
alone on the strive for time consístency. Section 2 shows the impact of
the information structure on the outcome with the help of some simple
examples. Section 3 elaborates on announcements, consistency and cheat-
ing. A simple linear quadratic example ia used to illustrate some pos-
sible outcomes whlch were desccibed in this íntroduction. Sec[ion 4 is a
conclusion. Defínitions and propositions are brought together in an ap-
pendix.4
2. On inEormation
Thls sectlon diticusses the tmpact oE the ínformation structure on the
outcome of Nasfi and Stackelberg games with [he help of some simple exam-
ples. Papers by Starr and Ho [1969a], [1969b], Simaan and Cruz [1973a],
[1973b] and Basar [1976] have particularly initiated understanding in
this field. The section is organized as follows. Firstly, the terminolo-
gy is briefly summarized. Secondly, some results are called to mínd.
Thirdly, a few examples illustrate these results and show some of the
typical problems and facts outsíde these results.
For the moment, two types of information structures are diatinguished:
- the o~en-loop information structure, where the players have no ínfor-
mation on the ~ctual state of the system; controls are a func[íon of
time and initíal s[ate.
- the closed-loop no memory or feedback information structure, where the
players have perfect information on the actual state of the system; con-
trols are a function of time and actual state.
For a fixed initial state an open-loop control is in fact only a func-
tion of time. In this case it belongs to the set of feedback controls.
Two modes of play are distínguished. In the l g obal mode the players lay
down their strategies at the begínning of the planning period. This mode
is compatible with both the open-loop and the feedback information
structure. In the stagewise mode the players decide at each point of
time. For each state which can be reached at that point of time a stra-
tegy is formulated such that the expected loss for the remainder of the
planning period is minimized. Stagewise solutions are sub-game perfect
(see Selten [1975]) where a sub-game is a game over the remainder of the
planning period. This mode is only compatible with the feedback informa-
tion structure.
Pontryagin's minimum principle solves global open loop problems and dy-
namic programming solves feedback stagewise problems (see e.g. de Zeeuw
[1984]). The other problems are mostly difficult to solve (see
examples).
Two more rules of a non-cooperative game are distinguished:
- the players act at the same time (simultaneously); they do not know
each others acttons in the curren[ and future periods when they act.
- the players act one after another (sequentially); in contrast to the5
simultaneouti c-oncept one of the players (the follower) knows the action
uf the ~ither player (the lc.~der) in the current period.
So far as a player does nut know tlie actions of the other player he has
to decide on thr basis of expectations wtth respect to these actions.
When these expectattons turn out [o be right a solution (an equilibrium)
for the game results. In the simultaneous case this equilibrium is call-
ed the Nash equilibrium. In the sequential case this equilibrium is
called the Stackelberg equilibrium.
In the case of two players the Stackelberg outcome is better for the
leader than the Nash outcome. For the follower the outcome can be worae,
but does not have to be worse.
in a strict convex ltnear yuadratic framework the (unique) linear feed-
hack global N:~tih ~~quillbrium coincides with the feedback stagewise Nash
~yutlibriwn (see de 7.eeuw [1984]). However, for a fixed initial state
the open-loop Nash solution is also a feedback global solution! As will
be seen helow tiie feedback global Stackelberg concept causes problems.
Three examples will enlighten this material.
F.xam le 1
Starr and Ao [19696] constructed the game represented by figure 1. There
are two players and two stages. At each stage each player has two possi-
ble controls: ~ and 1. Figure 1 shows the possible transitions and the
:issec l:~ted costti.6
Figure 1
Starr and Ho end up with the following results:
a) open-loop Nash solution:
ul(0) - 1, u2(0) - 0,
ul(1) - 1, u2(1) - 0,
with costs (3,2),
where ui(t) is the action of player i at stage t.
b) feedback stagewise Nash solution:
ul(0,1) - 0, u2(0,1) - 1,
ul(1,2) - 0, u2(1,2) - 0,
ul(1,1) - 1, u2(l,l) ~ 1,
ul(l,n) - 1, u2(1rn) - 0,
with costs (4,4),
where ui(t,x) is the ac[ion of player i at tíme t in state x.7
cl) fcedback glubal Nash solutton:
ul(0,1) - 0, u2(0,1) - 1,
ul(1,2) - 0, u2(1,2) - 0,
ul(1,1) - 1, u2(1,1) - 1,
with costs (4,4).
'l'he last result is not completely correct. Properly speaking there are
two mure feedback blubal Nash solutions:
c2) ul(0,1) - 1, u2(0,1) - 0, C3) ul(0,1) 3 0, u2(0,1) e 1,
ul(1,1) - 1, uZ(1,1) - 0, ul(1,2) a 0, u2(1,2) - 0,
ul(l,o) - 1, u2(l,o) - o, ul(1,1) a 1, u2(1,1) - o.
The solution (c2) is in fact the open-loop solution (a). Because the
inittal state is fixed, the open-loop strategiea are only a function of
timel This impLles that they can be concetved as feedback atrategies.
'I'ha~ tiulutlon (c3) dlife~rH only outr~lde the equtlihrtum tra,~ectory Erom
(cl). However, íf fur some reason the trajectory pasaes through state 1
at stage 1, only tlie soliition (cl) will yield a Nash equilibrium for the
remainder of the game. If this argument is extended to all possible
states at stage 1, the feedback stagewise solution (b) results. This is
the only solution which remains Nash after all possible mistakes. That
is to say, tliis is the only solution which is sub-game perfect (see
Selten [1975]) where the sub-game is the game over the remainder of the
planning period.
Finally, an interesting aspect of this example is tha[ the open-loop
solution dominates the feedback solution. That is to say, the outcome is
better for both players.8
Example 2 ( see de Zeeuw [1984]).
Consider the following two-stage linear quadratic game:
11 :- z (ul(o)tx2(2)).
,12 :- 2 (x2(1)~-u2(1)).
x(2) - x(1) t u2(1),
x(1) - x(0) f ul(0),
x(0) - x~
Player 2 is the leader and player 1 is the follower.
Open-loop Stackelberg solution:
u ~(fl) -- 5 xll, u~( 1) 3 5 xC.
with costs (0.36 x~, 0.1 x~).
Feedback stagewise Stackelberg solution:
ul(O,x) -- 2 x, u2(l,x) - 0,
with costs (0.`LS x~, 0.125 x~).
The open-loop Stackelherg solution i s time inconsistent.
Lincar fecdhnck ~;lobnl Stric~ki~lbery; Kame:
tiuppuse u2(l,x) - :ix;
rational reac[íon oE the Eollower:
u (O~x) - - (lfa)2 x.
1 1 f (1-ia)2 ~9
the leader faces the problem:
1 1 f a2 2
míntmize
2(----- 2 Z xo);
(lf(lfa) )
it fullows that the leader can enforce as low costs as he wants by
choosing "a" big enough; a big "a" can be considered as an incentive for
the follower to steer x(1) close to zero.
There are more information structures than the two mentioned above. For
example, there is the closed-loop-memory information structure, where
controls are a function of time and the state of the system in present
and past. Even in a strict convex linear quadratíc framework this infor-
matton structurc leads to infinitely many Nash solutions (see Basar and
Olsder [1982]). As will be seen in example 3 below there are closed loop
memury solnttuns which domínate both the open-loop and Eeedback solu-
tion! That is to say, the outcome is better for both players. A closed
loop memory Stackelberg solution can be found in Basar and Selbuz
[ 1979].
Example 3 (see de Zeeuw [1984]).
Consider the following two-stage strict convex linear quadratic game:
.11 :- Z (x2(o)fui(o)fx2(!)~i(1)tx2(2)),
JZ :- z (2x2(o)fu2(o)f2x2(1)~-u2(1)f2x2(Z)),
x(2) - x(1) f ul(1) f u2(1),
x(1) - x(o) f ul(o) f u2(o),
x(o) - x~.
Open-loop Nash solutlon:
ul(o) -- L9 x~, u2(o) ~- 19 x~,
ul(1) -- 19 xo' u2(1) -- 19 xC,with costs (0.56 x~, 1.191 x~).
Feedback stagewise Nash solution:
ut(~.x) -- 4 x, u2((),x) -- 36 x.
1 1
ul(l,x) -- 4 x, u2(l,x) -- 2 x,
with costs (0.559 x~, 1.198 x~).
The operrloop Nash solution is time consistent in the sense that the
actions ul(1) and uZ(1) relate to the state x(1) in the way as prescrib-
ed by the results of dynamic programming.
Consider the fo Rowin}; class of Linear closed-loop memory strategies:
ul(O,x) - cx, uZ(O,x) ~ fx,
ul(l,x,y) - ay t bx, u2(l,x,y) - dy f ex,
where x is the observed state at stage 0 and y is the observed state at
stage 1.
The Nash solutions are represented by tuples (a,b,c,d,e,f) which fit the
following set of equations:
4q - 1 t c f f,
Zqa - -I(k~ - f,
q~l - -:~q - c,
b - 19q f 2f ,
e- 18qt4c.
For all (c,f) such that 1 t c f f~ 0 this set of equations yields one
closed loop memory Nash solution.
For b- e- 0 ttie linear feedback global Nash solution results. It coin-11
cides with the feedback stagewise solution.
Some closed-loop memory solutions are dominated by others. The sub-set
of undominated solutions is given by:
-l0u t 19
(c,f) - 2 - ( 1-u,u), u ~ (0,1).
8u f 2u - 19
I~or example, for u- 3, the result is
ul(~'x) - - 127 x,
ul(1,x,Y) - 14 Y -
u2(~.x) - - 127 x,
127 x' u2(1,X,Y) ~ 14 y- 127 x'
with costs (0.551 xÓ, 1.189 x~).
This closed-loop memory Nash solution dominates both the open-loop Nash
solution and the Eeedback stagewise Nasli solution!
[~hatever nice properties the feedback stagewise solution may have, the
fact that it can be dominated by solutions with a comparable type of
information structure should at least be a matter of concern. A recon-
ciling approach could lie in [he definition of the state of the system
(see e.g. Tenney [1981]).3. On announcements, conststency and cheating.
Two earlier conclusions motivate this section. Firstly, in the Stackel-
berg solution concept the leader is better off than in the Nash concept.
Secondly, the Stackelberg solution is time inconsistent (except for the
feedback stagewise case which is time consistent by construction).
From the first conclusion the idea was born that in the case of simul-
taneous acting one of the players (e.g. the goverruaent) can try to be-
come a Stackelberg leader by making an announcement before the actual
play. When the other player is "naive" and believes the announcement,
the Stackel.berg solntíon may result. However, when the other player does
not give in to the attempt of the fírst player, he can try to force the
fírst player back to the NasV~ solution by playing Nash himself.
The introduction of an announcement implies the introduction of two pos-
sibilities to cheat on the announcement. The first possibility emanates
from time inconsistency. The optimal announcement generally becomes sub-
optimal after some actions are performed. An incentive arises to change
the original plan in the course of the game. Only a time consistent
strategy is "cheating-proof" in this respect. A time consistent strategy
is a strategy with the property that future reoptimizations will not
lead to a change in strategy. The second possibility occurs even in a
static context. The announcement generally díffers from "the optimal
reactton to the optimal reaction to the announcement". Only the Nash
announcement is "cheating-proof" in this respect. Moreover, the Nash
announcement is consistent. Therefore it will be called credible.
When cheating ís possible the question rises whether cheating is expect-
ed. Suppose that the second player expec[s the first player to cheat and
suppose the first player expects this, etc. A process results of optimal
reactions to and fro starting from the ínitial considerations of the
Eirst player. The credible solutíon concept is the only reasonable con-
cept for this situation.
Suppose that the second player does not expect the first player to
cheat. If the first player cheats anyhow, several outcomes are possible
depending on at what point of time he cheats. It is reasonable to assume
that after chea[ing has occurred the game falls back in the Nash mode.
The player who can cheat on his announcement has a choice. If he cheats,
from then on the Nash mode which is "cheating-proof" is the result. Zf13
he does not cheat, he can benefít from the Stackelberg mode and from
future possíbilities to cheat. After all this player has to compare a
cheating gain with a loss in reputation. The loss in reputation can be
conceíved as a penalty on chea[ing. This aspect should lead to a change
Ln the concept of credibility. Furthermore, [he expectation of the other
player with respect to this reputation should play a role here.
In the case of sequential acting the only cheating possibility emanates
from time inconsistency in the l g obai mode. The credible announcement is
the consistent Stackelberg announcement.
The feedback stagewise S[ackelberg solution (FBS) is consistent by con-
Structíon. A reoptimízation or a reconsideration of etrategy in the
course of the game will not lead to a change in strategy. In the case of
simultaneous acting the claim for credibility yíelds the feedback stage-
wise Nash (FBN) solution.
In an open-loop information structure the claim for consistency tends to
a contradictio in terminis. A reoptimization in the course of the game
seems to require information on the state of the system in the course of
the game which contradicts open-loop information. However, in this case
the state of the system has to be seen as solely a function of the ini-
tial state and the performed actions. A consistent open-loop Stackelberg
(C,nLS) solutíon cnn he~ deflned Hlong the ltnes of the model in Kydland
and Prescott [1977]. It will be clear that stochastic modelling will
fínci dífficulties here. In the case oE sequential acting the claim for
consistency or credibility yields the consis[ent open-loop Stackelberg
(COLS) solutíon. In the case of simultaneous acting the claim for con-
sistency gives the same solution. However, the claim for credibility
leads to the open-loop Nash (OLN) solution.
It is time to schematize these considerations and to give an example.
Table 1 shows the classical point of view. Two rules of the dynamic game
are emphasized:
- what informa[ion is available to the players?
- do the players act simultaneously or sequentially?
'f:~hle 2 lntruclcicc~ti whe~rt~ nc,cc~xssry the claim for consistency.
T:cble 3 extend:; the columny of tnble 1[o several poseibilities that
emanate from consídering one player to announce his strategy before [he
actual play. In addition, where possible, outcomes can be considered in
which somewhere cheating has occurred.14
open-loop
feedback~stagewise
simultaneous sequential
OLN OLS
FBN FBS
Table 1. Classical
open-Loup
Eeedb~ack~stagewise
simuitaneous sequential
OLN COLS
FBN FBS
Table 2. Consistency
sequential reputation consistent credible
open-loop OLS COLS COLS
feedback~stagewise FBS ~ FBS FBS
c hira l L nF;
possible
simultaneous reputation consistent credible
open-loop OLS COLS OLN
feedback~stagewise FBS FBS FBN
cheating clieating
possible possible
Table 3. Announcements
c11.N : open-loop N:~sh;
OI,S : upen-loop Stackelbery;
COLS: consistent open-Loop Stackelberg;
FBN : feedback~stagewise Nash;
FBS : feedback~stagewise Stackelberg.15
Example 4
The two-stage strict convex linear quadratic game from example 3 in sec-
tion 2 is considered again. Player 2 is the player who makes the an-
nouncement.
Table 4 lists the possible solutions.
u2(0) u2(1) ul(0) ul(1) x(1) x(2) J2 J1
OLS -0.286 0 -0.429 -0.143 0.286 0.143 1.143 0.653
COLS -0.286 -0.102 -0.408 -0.102 0.306 0.102 1.150 0.641
OLN -0.526 -0.105 -0.263 -0.053 0.211 0.053 1.191 0.560
FBS -0.321 -0.102 -0.374 -0.102 0.306 0.102 1.160 0.627
FBN -0.528 -0.111 -0.25 -0.056 0.222 0.056 1.198 0.559
Table 4
It is always true in two player games that the Stackelberg outcomes are
better for the leader than the Nash outcomes. In this example the fol-
lower is better off ín the Nash concept.
When the information structures are compared, player 2 has lower costs
in the open-loop structure and player 1 has lower costs in the feedback~
stagewise structure in this example.
Suppose that the players act sequentially and player 2 announces the
open-loop Stackelberg solution. In this case there is only one cheating
possibility due to time inconsistency. The outcome is:
u2(0) --0.286, ul(0) --0.429 x(1) ~ 0.286 J2 ~ 1.136
u2(1) --0.095, ul(L) --0.095 x(2) a 0.095 J1 s 0.642
The cheating gain Eor player 2 is 0.007. This gain has to be compared
with his loss in reputation. Note that cheating is also better for play-
er 1!
Suppose that the players act simultaneously. In this case there are se-
veral cheating possibilities, when cheating is not expected. Table 516
lists the outcomes. The numbers I and II refer to cheatíng in the first
and second period, respectively.
u2(0) u2(1) ul(0) ul(1) x(1) x(2) J2 J1
oLS-I -0.402 -0.085 -0.429 -0.085 0.169 0.042 1.115 0.608
OLS-II -0.286 -0.095 -0.429 -0.142 0.286 0.048 1.129 0.644
COLS-I -0.416 -0.088 -0.408 -0.044 0.175 0.044 1.123 0.601
COLS-II -0.286 -0.136 -0.408 -0.102 0.306 0.068 1.148 0.638
FBS-I -0.441 -0.093 -0.374 -0.046 0.186 0.046 1.138 0.589
FBS-II -0.321 -0.136 -0.374 -0.102 0.306 0.068 1.159 0.624
Tabel 5.
In the open-loop information structure the best possibility for player 2
is the open-loop Stackelberg announcement with cheating in the firs[
period. The cheating gain is 0.028. He should not cheat, when the penal-
ty on cheating or the loss in reputation is equal or higher than 0.028.
Note that player 1 has the second to lowest costs, when player 2 announ-
ces the consistent open-loop Stackelberg solution and cheats in the
first period. He achieves the lowest costs when Nash is announced (and
played).
In the Eeedback~stagewise information structure cheating in the first
period is also the best possibility. The gain is 0.022. The same remarks
for player l apply.17
4. Conclusion
This paper deals primarily with the possible role of information and
announcements in non-cooperative dynamic games where players act simul-
taneously.
~pen-loop and feecihack~stay;ewíse ínformation structures, which are di-
rectly llnkecl t~~ thr minimum ~,rinciple and dynamíc programming, are well
undersLood. lt. ís felt, however, that feedback~global and memory infor-
mation structures should still be subject of concern. For example, by
means of a simple two stage game it is shown that there exist many equi-
libria in these information structures which dominate both the classical
soluttons.
The analysis of announcements fits very well in the present discussion
in the literature with respect [o the interaction between a policy de-
claration by the government and the actual play by both the private sec-
tor and the government. It is tried to conceptualize when and to what
extent the classícal sequential solution concepts reappear. Furthermore,
Eor a simple example the several cheating possibilities for the leader
are evaluated against his loss of reputation.
All things considered the feedback~stagewise Nash solution concept seems
still the most appropriate concept for applications. It is a consistent,
credible or cheating-proof. and sub-game perfect equilibrium. However, it
presupposes state tnformatton. Moreover, when the concept of reputation
r.an be EormaLlred further, the leader role of the government may reap-
pear.18
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A~pendix
Let:
(i) T:- {0,1,2,...,tf-1} be the time axis.
(11) x(t) E X be the state of the system at time t,
t E {~,1,...,tf}
(iii) S2 be the informatfon set (note that R-X for the open-loop and
the feedback information structure)
(iv) Vi be the set of input values for player í(ia1,2)
(v) [ui:TxSl-.Vi] E Ui be the control law for player i(1~1,2)
(vi) Ji : X x U1 x U2 i IIt be the function that determines the out-
come of the game for player i(i~1,2)
(vii) [ui t:S2{Vi] E Ui t be the restriction of the control law ui to
~ .
the time point t(1-1,2, t~ T)
(viii)
ui,t ~- (ui,o'ui,l'~~~'ui,t-2'ui,t-1) E
Ui~t be the restriction
of the control law ui to the time interval [0, t-1]
(1-1,2, t E T)
(ix)
ui,t "- (ut,t'ut,tfl' "''vi,tf2'U1,tf-1) ~ Ui,t be ihe
restriction of the ~:ontrol law ui to the time interval
[t, tf-1)
(i-1,2, t E T)
Note that:
(ui,t' ui,tfl) - ui,t
(~i,t' ui,t) - ui,ttl
(ui~t. ui~t) - ui21
Definition 1(see Aasar and Olsdec [1982] p. 94)
~ ~
(ul, u2) is a global Nash equilibrium for x(0) ~ x0 if
~ ~ ~
a) J1(x0, ul, u2) c J1(x0, ul, u2) EJuI c U1
b) J2(x0, ul, u~) c,12(x0, ul, u2) j,u2 E U2
Defini[ion 2(see Basar and Olsder [1982]p. 127-128)
~ ~
(ul, u~) is a global Stackelberg equilibrium for x(0) a x0 if
~t
a) max ~ J2(x0,ul,u2) c
ul c F(x0,u2)
max J2(x0,ul,u2) du2 c U2
ul c F(x0,u2)
~ ~
b) ul E F(x0,u2)
where F(x0,u2) :- {ule U1IJ1(x0,ul,u2) c J1(x0,ul,u2) rul E U1}
I)efin(tion 3(see Basar and t)lsder [1982] p. 116-117)
~ ~
(ul,u2) is a stagewise feedback Nash equilibrium if
-~ -~t
a) J1(x(0).(ul~t,ul t),(u2 t'u2 t)) c , . .
-~ -~
J1(x(0),(ul,t'"l,t'ul,ttl).(u2~t,u2~t))Í~ul~t E Ul~t
-~ -~
b) J2(x(0).(ul~t,ul~t).(u2~t,u2~t)) c
J2íx(0).(~~l~t,ul~t),(~Z,t,u2,t'u2,tf1)) du2~t c U2~t
dt E T, dx(0) 6 X, dul t ~ U1 t, du2
t~ U2 t - ~ - ~ - ~ - ~22
Note that the last line of [his definition can be interpreted as "at any
time, at any reachable state of the system".
I)ol lnltlon 4 (~:re Bntiar :~nd f)Iscler [19H2) p. l31)
~ ~
(ul,u2) i s a stagewise feedback Stackelberg equilibrium if:
-,~ -,t
a) max „ -~ -,~ J2(x(U),(`-'l,t-t-1'"l,ttl),(u2,t,u2,t)) c
ul~t E
Ft(ul,tfl'u2,t) -
-,t
max „ -~ -~ J2(x(0),(ul
tfl'ul tfl)' , ,
ul,t E Ft(ul,tfl'("2,t'"2,tf1))
-~ I,
(`-'2,t'"2,t'"2,tfL)) v u2,t E U2,t
~ ~ -~ -~
b) ul~t c FC("l,ttl'u2,t)
dt E T, dx(0) t`C, dul t~ Ul t' ~"2 t~ U2 t - ~ - ~ - ~ - ~
where Ft(ul,tfl'u2~[)
:- ~ul~tc Ul~t IJ1(x(0),ul,u2) c
J1(x(0),(ul~t'ul,t'ul,tfl), (u2~t,u2~t)) dul~t E Ul~t}
Pro~osition 1
-~ ~
(ul,u2) is a global feedback Nash equilibrium (for x(0)~xU) if it is a
stagewise Nash equilibrium.
~
ProoE: The system player i(i-1,2) controls given u~(j~1,2,it~) is cau-
sal. Beliman's prínciple oE optimality is valíd so the (global)
optimal value of the objective functional can be found by dynamic
programming (see Rasar and Olsder [1982], p. 117)23
Proposition 2
In a strtct convex ltnear quadratic framework the global linear feedback
Nash equilibríum dx(0) E X exists and is unique.
This is also the unique stagewise feedback Nash equilibrium.
Proof: see de 7.eeuw [1984] p. 100.
Defini[ion 5(see Kydland and Prescott [1977])
A control law ui is consistent if dt 6 T, ui t minimizes the objective - ~
functional (in the class of admissable control laws) given x0 t X,
ui t, u t and player j's (re)actton u t.
. -j, j.
In the stagewíse mode, [hat is based on the idea oE optimization at any
moment in time, every equilibrium control law is consistent by construc-
tion. A global Stackelberg-leader control law is, in general, inconsis-
tent. A consistent global Stackelberg equilibrium can be defined as fol-
lows:
1et (for t E T) :
(i) Gl~t(x(0).ul~t,u2) :-
{ul~t E Ul~t I"l,tfl E Hl,ttl(x(0),(ul~t,ul~t),iiZ)} if t ~ tf-1
U1
(ii) Hl~t(x(0),u1~t,u2) --
~ul~t 6 Cl~t(x(()),ul~t,u2)~J1(x(0),(ul~t,ul~t),u2) G
if t s tf-1
Jlíx(0).(ul~t,ul~t),u2) Y ul~t s Gl~t(x(0),ul~t,u2)}24
(iit) Mt(x(li).~,i,t,n2,t) :-
`u2,t E U2,tlu2,tf1 f Nttl(x(U)s(ul~t,ul~t), ( U2~t,u2~t))
dul~t E Hl~t(x(~).ul~t,uZ)} if t~ tf-1
U2
(iv) Nt(x(~),ul t'u2 t) '- - ~ - ~
~u2,t L Ml(x(l)),ni t,u2,t)I ,
max J2(x(0),(ul
t'ul t) u2) ~ - ~ ~ ~
ul~t E Hl~t(x(~),ul t'uZ) ,
if t - tf-1
max J2(x(~),(ul
t,ui t).(u2 t.u2 t))
- - ' , , - . ,
ul t E H1 t(x(~)'ul t'(u2 t'u2 t))
, , , , .
du2~t E Mt(x(~).ul~t,~Z~t)}
I)effnit[on f,
~ ~ ---
(ul,u2) is a consistent Stackelberg equilibrium for x(0) ~ x0 if
~
a) u2 E NU(xo)
~ ~
b) ul E H1~0(x0,u2)i
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